Command line followed by query results for a recursive resolver without DNSSEC support:.The presence of the 'do' flag above implies that DNSSEC is enabled in the recursive name server. flags: qr aa rd QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 5 $ dig ANY_OLD_DOMAIN.c0m +dnssec | grep flags Command line followed by query results for a recursive DNSSEC enabled resolver configuration:.The following validation steps make the assumption that you will use a recent version of the dig client for dnssec query support. How can I check my BIND deployments remotely? It was he who helped me identify how others could remotely query for DNSSEC enablement among their BIND (recursive) server infrastructure. I leaned heavily on my buddy Mark, whom I consult on just about every DNS related issue.

I myself was not certain if my org was running DNSSEC. If you are not entirely certain whether your organization is running DNSSEC enabled configurations, especially among recursive resolver deployments which is where I understand would be the most logical target for most DNS cache poisoning attacks. It addresses a bug in which return values from some OpenSSL functions were left unchecked, making it theoretically possible to spoof answers from some signed zones. In this latter case, check with your vendor.įrom the BIND 'RELEASE NOTES' relative to each specific supported version:īIND 9.6.0-P1 is a SECURITY patch for BIND 9.6.0. No detail is available to support the identification of affected versions within vendor specific package management systems that use back ported versioning. The flaw affects all actively developed and supported versions prior to and resolved with today's release of BIND 9.3.6-P1, 9.4.3-P1, 9.5.0-P2(-W2), 9.5.1-P1 and 9.6.0-P1. Patch deployment would appear most critical among recursive name resolvers. If you or your organization is responsible for the operational management of any supported version of BIND 9.x and have explicitly enabled and utilize DNSSEC features, it may be time to consider planning your upgrade. Updates will be made if this is not the case. The bug appears to affect only specific BIND configurations where DNSSEC has been enabled. *NOTE* This patch release does not appear to be an emergency situation requiring immediate updates for all.

The Internet Systems Consortium has released an update for all supported BIND 9.x versions today (2009-Jan-07) containing a security patch to address a potential DNS poisoning vector.

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